In this paper I am merely analysing the meaning of Phaedo 99–107 without discussing either its historical significance or its value as a contribution to the logic of science. The paper attempts in fact to be little more than a paraphrase of the Greek, which aims only at accuracy of statement, but I am adding in the third section a note on the relation of this passage to the discussion of method in Republic VI, mainly in order to minimize its (...) relevance. The first section of the paper deals with the linguistic analysis of the text, the second, very sketchily, with the general doctrine. (shrink)

The Republic represents the good life as some sort of harmony or composition between the different interests of which the threefold nature of the soul makes it capable. The rational factor, τ λολιστικν, not only chooses which impulses shall be satisfied and which rejected but is credited also with impulses of its own, such as the desire for knowledge, to the importance of which the Republic testifies by various strands of argument. But in Plato's attempt to prove the goodness of (...) this mixed life he may be thought to have relied too much on arguments about its pleasantness. If he had really meant from the first to prove against Thrasymachus that the just life is more prolific in pleasure1 than the unjust, he would have had to undertake the task of proving a necessary connection between just activities and pleasant states of feeling which could scarcely exist unless feelings were under the control of the will. If this had been his intention, the whole weight of the argument would rest on the two comparatively short passages in Book IX in which he makes first a dubious appeal to experience and then, by an equally dubious piece of metaphysics, attempts to reinforce his ethical conclusion by denying the reality of such pleasures as might tend to throw doubt on it. (shrink)

Originally published in 1963, this classic book is a rethinking of the history of Western political philosophy. Charles N. R. McCoy contrasts classical-medieval principles against the "hypotheses" at the root of modern liberalism and modern conservativism. In Part I, "The Classical Christian Tradition from Plato to Aquinas," the author lays the foundation for a philosophical "structure" capable of producing "constitutional liberty." Part II, "The Modern Theory of Politics from Machiavelli to Marx," attempts to show, beginning with Machiavelli, the reversal and (...) destruction of the pre-modern "structure" postulated in Part I. McCoy stresses the great contributions of Aristotle to political thought found in his more familiar Ethics and Politics, but also includes key insights drawn from Metaphysics and Physics. These contributions are developed and perfected, McCoy argues, by Augustine and Aquinas. Two other important features include McCoy's epistemological insights into Plato's work that will be new to many readers and the author's juxtaposition of traditional natural law with "the modernized theory of natural law." The modern account of autonomous natural law, in McCoy's view, helps explain the totalitarian direction of key aspects of modern political thought. This classic volume on the origins of modern philosophical thought remains a standard in the field. (shrink)

The present volume completes the cataloguing of manuscripts. This impressive undertaking will be concluded with one further volume, which will contain addenda and extensive indexes to all the volumes. `a remarkable achievement of scholarship...The descriptions of the manuscripts are full and at the same time admirably concise...Any user of the work, whether his interests are palaeographical, iconographical, or textual, will be deeply grateful for the wealth of information contained in this volume'. Review of English Studies`will be invaluable not only for (...) reference but for the comprehensive and immensely precise assurance that it will give to scholars in every field of medieval studies that nothing relevant to their purposes now lurks in unrecorded concealment'. English Historical Review. (shrink)

The reply which Socrates makes to Zeno in the Parmenides and that which he makes to the φιλοθμονς in the Republic are perhaps connected chiefly by the fact that a false interpretation of either might prejudice the other, but it seems convenient to take them together for that reason even if they have not much actual connection in themselves. Both are controversial, and in the case of Socrates' reply to Zeno, no re-statement of it could be secure which did not (...) take account of Parmenides' reply to Socrates. For if Parmenides, as is maintained by some, is not attacking the doctrine of forms as such, but only Socratic theories of their relation with particulars, it would be natural to think that these theories about ‘participation’ had been the substance of Socrates' answer to Zeno. So it is impossible to avoid some discussion of the later passage, however cursory, as a preliminary. (shrink)

In Professor Ferguson's renewed study of these similes he has introduced a very detailed and careful analysis of Plato's analogies in order to explain and support his interpretation. He has also attacked the view which I put forward in 1932, and I should like to say something in defence of that view, not in any polemical spirit, but from a perhaps too obstinate belief that my reading of the passage does rest on solid foundations. I will not attempt any comprehensive (...) discussion of Professor Ferguson's theories, either in their earlier or their present form, but merely try to indicate what seems to me the real issue between us. (shrink)

What cognitive process allows a spectator to experience shock and surprise at a character’s actions, yet, a moment later, to decide that the actions presented onstage are coherent and understandable? Drawing upon theories of mindreading and conceptual blending, I offer a dynamic model of character that accounts for surprise, ambiguity, and dramatic shifts of understanding. Subtle changes to one’s perceptions, empathic imagination, and social knowledge—the sort of changes that accumulate throughout the viewing of Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night —can alter one’s understanding (...) of a character in unexpected ways. (shrink)

The UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority was right to permit tissue typing preimplantation genetic diagnosisOn July 21 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority , Britain’s regulatory agency for reproductive technologies, revised its policy on preimplantation genetic diagnosis for tissue typing.1,2 The authority of the HFEA to enact such a policy was affirmed by the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords, on April 28 2005.3 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis combines in vitro fertilisation with genetic testing. In PGD, embryos generally (...) undergo biopsy prior to the eight cell stage, followed by genetic testing for a particular trait. Tissue typing PGD is done to identify an embryo that is tissue matched for a child suffering from a severe disease requiring bone marrow or cord blood stem cell transplantation and for whom no living donor exists. This procedure was first performed in 2000.4 Precise matching of tissue types is critical to successful tissue transplant, and the donors of such tissues are often referred to as “saviour siblings”.Where a tissue matched individual already exists, extracting bone marrow from that individual or collecting cord blood already in storage, rather than creating a match, presents the most immediate treatment alternative. Bone marrow donation from adults or other medically competent individuals is not generally ethically contested, and bone marrow donation from medically incompetent individuals is also permissible under certain conditions.5 Where no living tissue donor exists, however, intentionally creating a donor through tissue typing PGD is among a short list of possible treatment options.The July HFEA policy change makes PGD licensable in cases where tissue typing is the only purpose of testing. Previously, PGD was licensable in the UK only for disease testing, and tissue typing PGD was permissible only when …. (shrink)